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Governments have begun to employ technological 
systems that use massive amounts of data and artificial 
intelligence (AI) in the domains of law enforcement, 
public health, or social welfare. In some areas, shifts in 
public opinion increasingly favor technology-aided 
public decision-making. This development presents an 
opportunity to explore novel approaches to how 
technology could be used to reinvigorate democratic 
governance and how the public perceives such changes. 
The study therefore posits a hypothetical AI voting 
system that mediates political decision-making between 
citizens and the state. We conducted a four-country 
online survey (N=6043) in Greece, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the US to find out what factors affect 
the public’s acceptance of such a system. The data show 
that Singaporeans are most likely and Greeks least 
likely to accept the system. Considerations of the 
technology’s utility have a large effect on acceptance 
rates across cultures whereas attitudes towards 
political norms and political performance have partial 
effects. 
1. Introduction  
Although the topic of automated decision-making 
generates considerable discussion (e.g., [1], [2], [3], 
[4]), relatively little is known about how governments 
employ complex systems that make use of AI. Most 
scholars focus on how governments should regulate 
these technologies but not on how states themselves 
employ them. This is true despite the fact that numerous 
state administrations utilize automated decision-making 
in law enforcement, public health, or social welfare [5]. 
Freeman Engstrom, Ho, Sharkey, and Cuéllar [6] point 
out that almost half of US federal agencies have 
experimented with AI tools or, at a preliminary stage, 
with algorithmic decision-making. In Europe, the use of 
such systems is experimental too, and the domains of 
application remained largely unmapped until recently 
[7]. Various European governments employ algorithmic 
decision-making and at times AI to facilitate policing 
[8], [9] or to control access to social security systems 
[10], [11]. In China, the central government implements 
large-scale projects that combine big data and AI 
technology (e.g., facial recognition systems) to monitor 
the behavior of individuals [12], [13]. 
At the same time, polities around the world struggle 
with political legitimacy. For example, the percentage 
of people in Europe and the US who feel it is “essential 
to live in a democracy” has fallen from two thirds to 
under one third during the period from World War II to 
2017 [14]. Additionally, the circulation of 
misinformation and fake news (e.g., [15]) puts a strain 
on civic and political cultures and causes discontent 
among sizable parts of the electorate with politicians, 
established political institutions, and their seeming 
inability to act in the interest of their constituents. In 
many places, this contributes to a sense of alienation, 
radicalization, and subversive populism [16]. This state 
of agitation gives rise to a loss of trust in political actors, 
which is essential to the proper working of democratic 
governance [17]. As Newton [18] points out, 
satisfaction with government and confidence in public 
institutions correlates significantly with generalized 
trust that provides an essential basis for all sorts of 
everyday activities. Degenerating trust in government 
thus implies harmful consequences for organized 
society as a whole. 
Evidently, questions about how to upgrade 
government systems in ways that improve governance 
and restore trust in public institutions are critical. In this 
regard, a few eye-catching, antithetical shifts in public 
opinion have taken place. For example, the proportion 
of Americans who believe that experts should decide 
what is best for the country rather than the government 
increased from 32% from the World War II period to 
49% in 2017 [14]. Public opinion surveys also find that, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Europeans are more 
open to trust experts [19]. In a similar vein, 51% of 
Europeans would support reducing the number of 
national members of parliament and giving those seats 
to an algorithm; this percentage reaches 75% in China 
and 40% in the US [20]. These developments present an 
opportunity to explore whether the public accepts novel 
technological systems and, if so, how they could be used 
to improve trust in institutions and good governance. 
Against this backdrop, we conducted a cross-
national survey to probe the public’s attitude towards a 






hypothetical AI system that exercises voting rights on 
behalf of citizens. The system we propose is unusual in 
at least two ways. First, it doubtlessly challenges widely 
held beliefs about the value of political participation and 
how it should be practiced in democracies. Second, the 
voting system likely attracts a host of well-known 
criticisms regarding discrimination, accountability, 
privacy, and human autonomy (e.g., [21], [22], [23], 
[24]), which are associated with algorithmic decision-
making and AI in general. Critics might also argue that 
while AI and related technologies perform some tasks 
exceptionally well, they are not good at predicting social 
outcomes [25]. These observations are certainly 
appropriate. In the near future, however, advancements 
in data hygiene, predictive accuracy, and fairness might 
alleviate some of these criticisms, which might make an 
AI system more suitable for the purposes intended here. 
We also propose that if such a system was implemented 
in a transparent and accountable manner, it could be 
used to devise policy proposals and for long-term 
planning that fosters democratic inclusiveness and 
technocratic effectiveness (technocracy is a form of 
government that relies on technical systems and expert 
knowledge for decision-making rather than on the 
political affiliation or the skill of representatives) [26]. 
More importantly, previous research indicates that the 
perception of decision-making driven by algorithms and 
AI depends on application contexts (e.g., media, health, 
or judicial contexts) [27], [28]. The hypothetical 
scenario at hand thus allows us to explore attitudes and 
opinions of the public about automated decision-making 
in the context of politics, an area which so far has 
received relatively little attention. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. 
Section 2 briefly outlines how we conceptualize the AI 
voting system. After that, Section 3 summarizes the 
theoretical assumptions and the conceptual model on 
which the survey is based. We then elaborate on the 
research method in Section 4 and eventually present the 
results, their discussion, and research limitations in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study with a few final 
thoughts. 
2. Conceptualizing an AI voting system 
What if a computer guided political decision-
making? This idea is not entirely new, even if it seems 
to spring from the current zeitgeist. As Lepore [29] 
shows, behavioral researchers tried to devise a machine 
that predicts public opinion and attitudes as early as the 
1960s. Back then, the aim was to develop a computer 
model that simulates the behavioral processes of 
everyone in a given population. On this simulated 
reality, generated from representative samples and from 
the processing power of computers, the researchers 
envisioned to test ads for consumer goods. Marketing 
goods and services, however, was not their sole interest. 
On top of that, they tried to build a general model of 
society that would predict individual voting behavior 
and, at the same time, simulate political processes at an 
aggregate level. The scientists called this the “people 
machine” [29]. 
Opinion polls and electoral forecasts are 
commonplace today, but a complete simulation of 
voting publics never came about. However, today’s 
advances in data collection technologies and AI might 
make the prediction and use of political preferences on 
a large scale more feasible. To capture this idea in a 
material way, we envisage a hypothetical AI voting 
system that collects vast amounts of data about voters. 
Data already available to administrative agencies and 
additional data voluntarily provided to the government 
by its citizens could be combined and used as inputs to 
the system that assesses the political preferences of 
every citizen. The insights generated by the system 
could inform political decision-making with the aim to 
improve political participation and representative 
government. Ultimately, this would result in two 
different types of voting systems, one representing a 
more radical departure from current voting practices 
than the other. Using the more radical type of system, 
constituents would no longer cast votes but would see 
themselves represented by the insights generated 
through the AI voting system. The second more 
moderate type would use the data-based 
recommendations of the AI system as a tool that 
supports political decision-making and runs alongside 
traditional voting systems. 
To test whether and under what conditions the 
public would support the use of an AI voting system, we 
presented survey respondents with the following 
vignette: “Imagine the following situation. The 
government in your country implements a new voting 
system driven by artificial intelligence (AI). This new 
system gathers various digital data about you to find out 
about your opinions, ideas, and political preferences. 
Based on the information available on all citizens, 
policy proposals would be developed and those 
proposals that represent the majority of people would be 
put into law. This would therefore mean that the AI 
voting system votes on your behalf instead of you 
actively casting a vote.” After reading this description, 
the respondents were asked to answer the survey 
questions. 
3. Theoretical development 
The survey is based on four key assumptions (see 
Figure 1 for a visual summary). First, based on the 
technology acceptance model (TAM) [30], we expect 
Page 2312
 
that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use 
explain potential users’ acceptance of the AI voting 
system. Second, we assume that socio-demographic 
factors such as age, gender, and income affect the 
propensity to accept the system. Third, we assume that 
aspects of political support occupy an important role. 
Fourth, we anticipate that general trust in technology 
across different situations interacts with the acceptance 
of the system. The following paragraphs provide a more 
detailed overview of these assumptions and Table 1 
presents a summary of the variables, measurements, and 
hypotheses. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model to be tested. 
3.1 Technology acceptance model 
In information systems research, one of the ongoing 
issues is to identify factors that cause people to accept 
and make use of technological systems developed and 
implemented by others. Because of its relatively 
straightforward underlying assumptions, TAM is one of 
the most widely employed models to do so. Based on 
theory from psychology [31], TAM uses perceived 
usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) to 
predict the intention of potential users to make use of a 
technological innovation. Davis [30] defines PU as the 
extent to which people believe that an application will 
help them perform better. A system high in PU is thus 
one for which a user believes in the existence of a 
positive use-performance relationship. In addition, this 
relationship is theorized to be influenced by PEOU. 
Venkatesh and Davis [32] define PEOU as “the degree 
to which a person believes that using a particular system 
would be free of effort”. Thus, according to TAM, a 
technological system that is perceived to be useful and 
easy to use is likely to be accepted by users. 
Based on TAM theory, we consider three scenarios 
that result in a positive use-performance relationship. 
The AI voting system will be seen as useful (1) if it 
renders politics more transparent, (2) if it leads to better 
policies than traditional policy-making processes, (3) 
and if it advances direct democracy (that is, if voters are 
able to directly decide on policy initiatives instead of 
relying on elected representatives). Regarding PU, we 
therefore derive a first set of hypotheses: 
• H1.1: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that the AI voting system creates more 
transparency. 
• H1.2: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that the AI voting system leads to better 
policies. 
• H1.3: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe the AI voting system advances direct 
democracy. 
With respect to PEOU, we posit the following. If 
respondents believe that their interaction with the 
system would be clear and understandable and if they 
trust that the system would work as promised, they 
perceive that using the system is free of effort. Based on 
these premises, we establish a second set of hypotheses: 
• H2.1: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that their interaction with the AI voting 
system would be clear and understandable. 
• H2.2: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that the AI voting system would work 
properly. 
The above assumptions establish a baseline for the 
inquiry into the acceptance of the AI voting system. 
However, we expand beyond this core structure to 
explore an additional range of potential contextual 
influences (i.e., socio-demographic factors, political 
support, and trust in technology). Previous research 
(e.g., [33]) shows that such modifications are frequent 
and well accommodated by TAM. 
3.2 Socio-demographic factors 
Findings about how age and gender affect 
technology acceptance usually do not lead to firm 
conclusions. However, previous research indicates that 
older people are more susceptible to computer anxiety 
[34] and that increasing age negatively affects 
acceptance [35]. We therefore assume that younger 
respondents are more likely to accept the system. 
Regarding gender, Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis 
[36] found that technology acceptance of younger men 
is strongly affected by PU, whereas the acceptance of 
older women is more strongly influenced by PEOU. 
Even if evidence about the effect of gender is 
inconclusive and gender likely interacts with age, we 
assume on an exploratory basis that acceptance is higher 
among men: 
• H3.1: Acceptance is higher among younger 
respondents. 
• H3.2: Acceptance is higher among male 
respondents. 
Compared to age and gender, the importance of 
education and income on an individual’s technology 
acceptance is well documented (e.g., [37]). Previous 
research shows that education is negatively related to 
computer anxiety and positively related to technology 
acceptance in general [38]. We therefore assume that 
acceptance is higher among individuals with more 
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education. In parallel, Rogers [39] maintains that 
technological innovations tend to spread in society 
through groups that have higher socio-economic status. 
These groups, the argument goes, possess a more 
favorable attitude towards decisions to accept new 
technologies and, more importantly, usually have higher 
incomes. We thus assume that acceptance is higher for 
respondents with larger incomes: 
• H3.3: Acceptance is higher among respondents with 
more education. 
• H3.4: Acceptance is higher among respondents with 
more income. 
Whether the surrounding geography of a 
respondent’s place of residence influences technology 
acceptance is unclear. Research that studies the “digital 
divide” between metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas concludes that while geographical location does 
affect the use of information technology, status 
indicators such as education or income are better 
predictors [40]. Nonetheless, we assume that 
respondents who reside in urban areas are more likely to 
accept the AI voting system. We thus derive the 
following hypothesis: 
• H3.5: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
live in urban areas. 
3.3 Political support 
The survey considers differences in political 
cultures with the aim to compare the distinct contexts of 
the countries in the sample. As Straub, Keil, and 
Brenner [41] show, there is reason to believe that 
cultural differences affect technology acceptance. To 
operationalize what we call political culture, we rely on 
Thomassen and van Ham’s [42] framework of political 
support. In this framework, political support is defined 
as an attitude by which individuals situate themselves, 
either favorably or unfavorably, vis-á-vis the political 
community, the political regime, and the political 
authorities. Conceptually, political support 
encompasses normative judgments and attitudes about 
the rightful exercise of political power, e.g., preferences 
for a democratic political system, but also 
considerations of short-term utility, e.g., the satisfaction 
with the performance of the current government [43]. 
In line with the framework [44], the survey 
measures political support at three levels: regime 
principles, regime performance, and regime institutions. 
At the level of regime principle, the survey asks 
respondents whether they support governance by 
experts and whether voting is important to them. We 
hypothesize that acceptance is higher among those who 
support the rule by experts because, like technocratic 
decision-making, the AI voting system would advance 
decision-making based on specialized knowledge and 
performance rather than political affiliation or 
parliamentary skill. We also propound that the 
acceptance is higher among those respondents to whom 
voting is less important. This assumption is based on the 
view that those who value casting votes as an effective 
means of political participation might be unwilling to 
replace it with something that profoundly challenges 
established political decision-making processes. As a 
result, we arrive at the following hypotheses: 
• H4.1: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that experts should decide what is best. 
• H4.2: Acceptance is higher among respondents to 
whom voting is less important. 
At the level of regime performance, the survey asks 
respondents whether they view the political system of 
their country as just and fair. In addition, respondents 
are asked to rate their satisfaction with the functioning 
of the political system in their country. On both counts, 
we expect that the acceptance of the system is higher for 
those who are less satisfied with regime performance. 
We assume so because low levels of satisfaction 
presumably generate little motivation to preserve the 
status quo and leaves individuals open to change. The 
corresponding hypotheses are: 
• H4.3: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe the political system of their country is 
characterized by low levels of justice and fairness. 
• H4.4: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
exhibit low levels of satisfaction with the 
functioning of the political system in their country. 
At the level of political institutions, the survey 
queries respondents about their level of confidence in 
the national government and about how effective and 
competent they perceive politicians to be. Here, we 
assume that low confidence in government and 
politicians results in higher acceptance of the AI voting 
system. I.e., if respondents believe that political actors 
are untrustworthy or incompetent, they might perceive 
AI voting as a remedy that counteracts self-serving and 
ill-informed behavior. As a result, we posit the 
following hypotheses: 
• H4.5: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
have little confidence in the national government. 
• H4.6: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that politicians are ineffective and 
incompetent. 
Finally, the survey asks respondents about their 
own political efficacy [45]. Strictly speaking, the 
framework put forth by van Ham and Thomassen [44] 
does not mention self-reported political efficacy. 
However, from a conceptual point of view, including it 
aligns with the framework’s overall goal which seeks to 
assess individuals’ political attitudes towards regimes. 
We therefore add self-reported political efficacy and 
hypothesize that respondents who feel insecure about 
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evaluating political issues are more likely to accept the 
system. We do so based on the assumption that 
politically diffident individuals might willingly offload 
some of the mental effort required to participate in 
politics onto the AI voting system. This allows us to 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
• H4.7: Acceptance is higher among respondents with 
low levels of self-reported political efficacy. 
3.4 Trust in technology 
Modifications to TAM include the addition of trust 
as an independent variable to improve its predictive 
power [46]. In general, trust is crucial to almost any type 
of social interaction in which uncertainty exists or 
undesirable outcomes might result [47]. Similar to trust 
in people, information systems research construes trust 
as the belief that a technology has the attributes 
necessary to perform as expected [48]. McKnight, 
Carter, Thatcher, and Clay [49] are more specific and 
provide definitions for a set of different kinds of trust. 
From among these definitions, we are specifically 
interested in what they call the propensity to trust in 
general technology. This conception of trust captures 
the tendency to be willing to rely on technology 
independent from situational influences or the specific 
technology in question. Based on this understanding, the 
survey asks respondents whether they trust that 
technology generally works the way it is promised to 
and if they believe that technology is generally more 
reliable than its human counterparts. For both questions, 
we assume that acceptance is higher for individuals with 
more general trust in technology: 
• H5.1: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that technology is generally reliable. 
• H5.2: Acceptance is higher among respondents who 
believe that technology is more reliable than its 
human counterpart. 
4. Method  
To collect the data, an online survey was conducted 
in Greece (GR), Singapore (SG), Switzerland (CH), and 
the United States (US). These countries were chosen 
based on three selection criteria: (1) form of 
government, (2) political trust, and (3) technological 
affinity. Greece, Switzerland, and the US are all full 
democracies with relatively similar forms of 
government. In contrast, Singapore is the only semi-
democratic country. Political trust, measured as 
confidence in parliament, is low in Greece (14.2%) and 
the US (14.8%), middling in Switzerland (54.4%), and 
high in Singapore (75.5%) [50]. To measure 
technological affinity, the percentage of the population 
that frequently uses the Internet was used as a rough 
proxy. Here, Greece ranks low (70%) [51], Switzerland 
(85.7%) [52] and the US (83%) [53] rank in the middle, 
and Singapore ranks highest (93%) [54]. As illustrated 
in Table 2 (see Appendix), the countries vary on several 
of the selection criteria. A juxtaposition along these 
criteria is expected to enable comparability and the 
observance of differences that provide hints at 
generalizable inferences across countries. 
The questionnaire was developed based on the 
research presented in this paper and was self-
administered by respondents. The respondents were 
recruited by a market research firm based in Germany 
using a non-probability river sampling method, i.e., by 
inviting them to follow links posted on the web. The 
links were placed on a variety of apps and mobile 
websites geared towards different activities and 
interests, e.g., shopping (e.g., Amazon), social 
networking and picture sharing (e.g., Instagram), 
gaming (e.g., DesignHome), and messaging (e.g., Line). 
Respondents could earn rewards for their participation 
such as access to premium content, extra features, 
Table 1. Variables, measurements, and hypotheses 
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vouchers, or small cash prizes. Before answering the 
questionnaire, respondents went through a suitability 
screening which collected their age, gender, and level of 
education. The screening process also served as a 
security measure that prevented bots from participating 
in the survey. The final sample only includes 
respondents that completed every survey question. 
Incomplete responses were removed from the sample. 
In addition, respondents who straight-lined answers or 
substantially deviated from the median response time 
were excluded from the statistical analysis and all 
further use. Such answers are typically of insufficient 
quality due to fraud, fake answers, or excessive 
satisficing [55]. Overall, this led to a sample size of 
6043 (1612 in GR, 1705 in SG, 1094 in CH, and 1632 
in the US). The socio-demographic characteristics of the 
sample are presented in Table 3 and 4 in the Appendix. 
The total breakoff rates were at 39% in Switzerland, 
29% in Greece, 40% in Singapore, and 38% in the US. 
Because the analysis is based on an online river 
sample, the results of this survey resemble the Internet-
connected population of each country. That is, the 
respondents in our sample are slightly younger than the 
general population and, because of the online nature of 
the survey, they likely show more of a natural liking for 
technology. However, even if the estimates for the 
distributions of respondents’ characteristics are 
vulnerable to a certain degree of bias, the ranks and 
relations between categories in non-probability online 
surveys hold when compared to simple random 
sampling [55]. To improve the representativeness of the 
sample, country-specific age (18-65) and gender quotas 
were created based on the most recent census data from 
the Barro Lee data set [56]. Once these quotas were met, 
the data was weighed to corrected for minor under- and 
overrepresentation of population subgroups.  
Eventually, we analyzed the data using multivariate 
ordered logistic regression in R to estimate the 
proportional odds coefficients. The dependent variable 
of interest was the acceptance of the AI voting system, 
measured with the following statement: “In general, I 
would support the use of the AI voting system.” 
Respondents could choose from the following answer 
options: “strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor 
disagree, agree, strongly agree”. The next section 
presents the results of this analysis and starts out by 
introducing the distribution of characteristics regarding 
the acceptance of the AI voting system. After that, the 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable are elaborated on. The hypothesized 
assumptions of TAM are examined first, followed 
sequentially by the effects of socio-demographic 
factors, political support, and trust in technology.  
5. Results  
The results demonstrate that acceptance is highest 
among Singaporeans (39% acceptance vs. 34% 
nonacceptance). Singaporeans are also most likely to 
perceive the AI voting system as useful and easy to use. 
The Swiss express support for and opposition to the 
system in equal measure (37% acceptance vs. 37% 
nonacceptance). In contrast, a sizeable part of the 
American sample rejects the system (37% acceptance 
vs. 45% nonacceptance). Greek respondents adopt the 
most hesitant attitudes and express the lowest 
acceptance rate and the highest nonacceptance rate 
(25% acceptance vs. 50% nonacceptance). In addition, 
relatively large portions of respondents (between 18% 
and 27%) are undecided. Figure 2 offers a summary of 
these distributions. To follow up on these insights and 
to test the hypotheses developed above, the following 
section presents the results of the ordered logistic 
regression analysis. 
5.1 Effects on acceptance 
We estimated the odds ratios (OR), summarized in 
Figure 3, to test our hypotheses. OR quantify the 
strength of the association between two variables. An 
OR greater than 1 denotes a positive association 
between the variables in question. An OR equal to 1 
means that there is no association and an OR smaller 
than 1 stands for a negative association (for a detailed 
explanation of OR see [57]). 
Our hypotheses based on TAM predict that PU and 
PEOU positively affect acceptance. H1.2, H1.3, and 
H2.2 can be squarely accepted because the results are 
significant and positive. For example, the results for 
H1.2 are highly significant (p<.01), and the OR are 
positive across countries (Switzerland, OR=1.7; Greece, 
OR=2; Singapore, OR=1.6; US, OR=1.8). For H1.2, the 
odds to accept the system are thus 1-2 higher for 
respondents who believe that AI voting system produces 
better policies than for respondents who do not share 




this view. On a similar basis, H1.1 and H2.1 hold for all 
countries except for Greece and the US 
correspondingly; no significant effect is measurable for 
both cases. Overall, however, the analysis provides 
reasonable evidence to support the hypothesized TAM 
assumptions. 
The analysis further shows that socio-demographic 
factors are relatively weak predictors, if significant 
effects occur at all. Contrary to H3.1, age exerts no 
significant influence on the likelihood to accept. In a 
similar fashion, education (H3.3) and income (H3.4) do 
not affect acceptance. Gender produces a small effect in 
Singapore and the US, albeit in opposite directions, but 
not in Switzerland and Greece. Accordingly, 
Singaporeans are marginally more likely to accept the 
system if they are female (OR=0.8) whereas Americans 
are more likely to accept if they are male (OR=1.2). The 
rural urban distinction has no significant impact bar in 
the US. American city dwellers are somewhat more 
likely to accept the system than respondents living in 
rural areas (OR=1.3). 
The effects of political support are disparate. At the 
level of regime principles, we find some evidence in 
support of H4.2, which states that respondents to whom 
voting is important are less likely to accept the system. 
This holds true for Greece (OR=0.8), Singapore 
(OR=0.9), and the US (OR=0.9), all of which show 
small but highly significant effects. In Switzerland, the 
effect is negative as well (OR=0.9) but not significant. 
H4.1 concerning the fondness of technocratic decision-
making by experts produces no significant effects across 
all countries. At the level of regime performance, the 
perceived fairness (H4.3) and the perceived satisfaction 
with the functioning of the political system (H4.4) 
produce no effects as well, except for a minimal impact 
of the latter in Singapore (OR=1.1, p<.10). The analysis 
establishes no significant effects at the level of regime 
institutions which concerns confidence in government 
(H4.5) and the perceived effectiveness of politicians 
(H4.6). However, self-reported political efficacy (H4.7) 
has a modest but highly significant effect on the 
acceptance of the system. Respondents in Switzerland 
(OR=1.3), Singapore (OR=1.2), and the US (OR=1.1) 
who are politically insecure are more likely to support 
the use of system. This relation is positive in Greece too 
(OR=1.1); however, it is not significant. 
Finally, we find no support for H5.1 due to the 
negligible size and the statistical insignificance of the 
effect. Yet, there is evidence in support of H5.2. The 
hypothesis states that respondents who believe that 
technology is more reliable than its human counterpart 
are more likely to accept the system. This holds for 
Greece (OR=1.2), Singapore (OR=1.3), and the US 
(OR=1.2) but not for Switzerland (OR=1). 
5.2 Discussion 
In this paper, we introduced and tested a 
hypothesized model of AI voting acceptance. According 
Figure 3. Proportional odds logistic regression: effects on the acceptance of the AI system. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the 
effects of differences in people’s attitudes towards 
governments and political actors on the acceptance of 
decision-making driven by AI technologies. First, we 
evaluated the effect of TAM on acceptance and found 
that the two base variables of PU and PEOU are good 
predictors across Greece, Singapore, Switzerland, and 
the US. The reliability of TAM across country-specific 
contexts is a first notable finding. It contributes to the 
strand of research that investigates TAM’s predictive 
power across cultures [41]. Because of its reliability, 
TAM also provided a useful starting point from which 
to extend the analysis to political support, trust in 
technology, and socio-demographics. Overall, we find 
that normative judgements about the importance of 
voting and people’s self-assessed political efficacy 
affect acceptance. Thus, political culture appears to be 
at least a contributing factor in the perceived desirability 
of automated decision-making in public institutions. We 
discuss the limits of this finding and point out 
unresolved questions. 
If we consider the criteria based on which the 
countries in our sample were selected (i.e., forms of 
government, political trust, and technological affinity), 
political trust provides an explanation for acceptance 
rates. For example, political trust as well as acceptance 
rates are high in Singapore whereas political trust and 
acceptance rates are low in Greece. This positive 
association between political trust and acceptance also 
holds for Switzerland. But the US does not fit into this 
pattern. More importantly, however, this heuristic way 
of reasoning finds limited support in our quantitative 
analysis. Out of the seven variables that measure 
political culture, two (i.e., the perceived importance of 
voting and political self-efficacy) are associated with 
acceptance rates. 
A similar picture emerges for trust in technology. 
Again, if we compare technological affinity (another 
criterion based on which we selected the countries in our 
sample) and acceptance rates, the two roughly match. 
I.e., Singapore has high acceptance rates and high 
technological affinity and, conversely, Greece shows 
low acceptance rates and low technological affinity. 
This association holds for the US and Switzerland too. 
But, as pointed out above, this pattern is based on a 
rough and ready heuristic. Taking the results of the 
logistic regression analysis into account, we see that one 
out of two relevant variables associates trust in 
technology with acceptance rates. We thus find tentative 
support for theory that proposes a positive relationship 
between trust and technology use (e.g., [48], [49]). 
Finally, our results on age and gender variables do 
not lead to fixed conclusions. As shown by others (e.g., 
[36]) the relationship between age, gender, and 
technology use is quite complex and escapes 
straightforward explanations. Our data shows no 
association between age and acceptance rates. In 
comparison, gender appears to have a slight influence 
on acceptance in Singapore (women are more like to 
accept) and the US (men are more likely to accept). In 
addition, the data shows that income, education, and 
rural-urban differences are not associated with 
acceptance. This is surprising because such correlations 
are relatively well documented in theory (e.g., [39]) as 
well as in empirical work (e.g.,[40]). 
Taking everything into account, this study presents 
two main findings. First, usefulness and user-
friendliness are good predictors of AI voting acceptance 
across cultures. Second, trust in technology and specific 
aspects of political culture likely contribute to 
technology acceptance. To better understand the 
implications of these findings, questions about the 
antecedents of trust in technology and of political 
culture seem to require more scrutiny. This study cannot 
answer such questions, but we believe that this is a 
promising avenue for further investigation. For 
example, research on digital inequality [58] illustrates 
that socioeconomic status affects technology related 
skills and access. Thus, positing socioeconomic factors 
such as income and education as antecedents to self-
assessed political efficacy or the perceived importance 
of voting might further refine our ability to explain the 
acceptance of AI voting. 
5.3 Limitations 
The sample analyzed in this study was collected by 
means of a non-probability sampling mechanism, which 
is susceptible to topical self-selection bias and economic 
self-selection bias [59]. Quotas based on age and gender 
were implemented and the survey results were weighted 
to correct for inequalities in the probability of selection 
and to reduce possible sources of biases. However, the 
survey does not cover parts of the population without 
access to the Internet. I.e., survey results apply first and 
foremost to the Internet-connected population of each 
country and inferences to the general population level 
should be treated with caution. In addition, the vignette 
on which we base respondents’ answers is hypothetical. 
The wording of the vignette and the overall speculative 
nature of the phenomenon under study might skew the 
evaluative tendencies of respondents. While this issue 
cannot be completely avoided, previous research shows 
that respondents do treat hypothetical items like 
meaningful opinions that correlate with personality 
dispositions [60]. 
6. Conclusion  
AI voting is a contentious topic. In our final tally, 
the idea finds support in just one out of four countries; 
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in another, the public is undecided, and the publics of 
two countries reject it. Looking beyond this bottom-line 
total, however, we can see that if an AI voting system 
provided demonstrable practical benefits to voters, the 
general tenor of attitudes could become more favorable. 
A proof of concept, including the corroboration of its 
technical feasibility, would likely dispel some of the 
ambivalence regarding AI voting. 
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Table 2. A comparison of the criteria for the selection of the sample countries 
 
  
 Greece Singapore Switzerland USA 
Form of government Parliamentary republic Anocracy Direct democracy Presidential republic 
Political trust 14.2% 75.5% 54.4% 14.8% 









 Percent Mean SD n 
Greece    1612 
Age  38.38 11.16  
Male 50.4   812 
Female 49.6   800 
Level of education     
No formal education 0.6   9 
Low 2.5   40 
Medium 45.0   725 
High 51.9   838 
Household income per month     
≤ € 210 5.3   85 
≤ € 410 6.9   111 
≤ € 830 19.1   308 
≤ € 1700 28.8   465 
≤ € 2500 15.1   243 
≤ € 3300 5.1   82 
≤ € 5000 2.4   38 
≤ € 6600 0.3   5 
≤ € 8300 0.6   9 
≤ € 9900 0.2   3 
≤ € 12000 1.3   21 
> € 12000 2.4   39 
Prefer not to say 12.6   203 
Residence status     
Rural 13.2   213 
Urban 86.8   1399 
Singapore    1705 
Age  38.30 11.93  
Male 51.8   884 
Female 48.2   821 
Level of education     
No formal education 2.8   47 
Low 15.8   270 
Medium 26.4   450 
High 55.0   938 
Household income per month     
≤ € 210 3.8   64 
≤ € 410 2.5   42 
≤ € 830 3.6   61 
≤ € 1700 8.4   144 
≤ € 2500 9.2   157 
≤ € 3300 8.6   147 
≤ € 5000 15.2   260 
≤ € 6600 14.1   241 
≤ € 8300 8.7   148 
≤ € 9900 6.4   109 
≤ € 12000 4.2   71 
> € 12000 6.1   104 
Prefer not to say 9.2   157 
Residence status     
Rural 15.95   272 
Urban 84.05   1433 
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Table 4. Sample characteristics (part 2 of 2)  
 
 
 Percent Mean SD n 
Switzerland    1094 
Age  39.01 12.76  
Male 52.5   574 
Female 47.5   520 
Level of education     
No formal education 3.0   33 
Low 12.7   139 
Medium 37.3   408 
High 47.0   514 
Household income per month     
≤ € 210 2.1   23 
≤ € 410 2.2   24 
≤ € 830 3.3   36 
≤ € 1700 6.2   68 
≤ € 2500 6.3   69 
≤ € 3300 6.9   76 
≤ € 5000 14.5   159 
≤ € 6600 12.5   137 
≤ € 8300 11.2   122 
≤ € 9900 10.1   111 
≤ € 12000 6.4   70 
> € 12000 5.2   57 
Prefer not to say 13.0   142 
Residence status     
Rural 35.4   387 
Urban 64.6   707 
United States    1632 
Age  39.64 12.67  
Male 48.8   796 
Female 51.2   836 
Level of education     
No formal education 1.7   28 
Low 6.6   107 
Medium 35.9   586 
High 55.8   911 
Household income per month     
≤ € 210 5.3   86 
≤ € 410 2.9   47 
≤ € 830 6.7   109 
≤ € 1700 11.5   188 
≤ € 2500 10.2   166 
≤ € 3300 7.0   115 
≤ € 5000 8.6   140 
≤ € 6600 6.1   99 
≤ € 8300 5.8   94 
≤ € 9900 4.8   78 
≤ € 12000 6.7   110 
> € 12000 18.0   293 
Prefer not to say 6.6   107 
Residence status     
Rural 32.0   523 
Urban 68.0   1109 
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